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Abstract 
Student achievement has been identified as an important contributor to economic growth. This 
paper investigates the hypothesis that redistributive government activities have a negative 
effect  on  investment  in  human  capital  using  data  from  international  comparative  student 
achievement tests in Mathematics and Science for over 70 countries during the period 1980 to 
2003.  In  fixed  effects  models,  the  impact  on  student  achievement  of  both  government 
consumption and government social expenditures are negative and seem to be robust across 
different  model  specifications.  The  effect  of  social  expenditures  appears  to  be  driven  by 




Keywords: Student achievement; welfare state; panel data, PISA, TIMSS 
JEL codes: H20; I20; C33 
                                                 
∗ Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Dragvoll, N-7491 Trondheim, 
Norway, e-mail: Torberg.Falch@svt.ntnu.no 
+ Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Sveavägen 65, SE-11383 Stockholm, Sweden, 
and Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universitaet Konstanz, Switzerland, e-mail: Justina.Fischer@hhs.se   1 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The equity-efficiency quandary of the welfare state is usually attributed to perverse incentive 
effects in the labor market. The welfare state includes ‘unproductive’ government spending 
which reduces the return to work and is financed by distortionary taxes. Drawing an analogy 
to  investment  in  human  capital,  the  present  paper  analyzes  whether  welfare  state  aspects 
affect the performance in compulsory schooling in an international panel data framework.  
 
The welfare state can be seen as a social insurance mechanism, see for example Sinn (1995). 
But if the insurance terms for the insured improve, her incentives to invest to avoid capture 
are weakened. This moral hazard problem may  have detrimental effects on investment in 
human  capital,  saving,  and,  ultimately,  economic  growth.  However,  the  empirical  cross-
country literature indicates that there is no relationship between government expenditures and 
growth,  although  the  results  vary  somewhat  across  studies,  see  for  example  Fölster  and 
Henrekson (2001) and Agell, Ohlsson and Thoursie (2006). However, Bjørnskov, Dreher and 
Fischer  (2007) find that higher government consumption spending is related to less well-
being, perhaps through misallocation of resources and the inefficiencies mechanisms inherent 
in taxation. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) distinguish between different types of taxes 
and spending categories, and find that overall government expenditures induce growth, but 
with  welfare  expenditure  having  significantly  lower  effect  compared  to  what  they  call 
“productive expenditures”. Similarly, Zhang and Zhang (2004) find positive effects of old-age 
benefits on education (secondary enrolment rates) and economic growth, while Ehrlich and 




In this paper we investigate whether government involvement in the economy through public 
goods creation and income redistribution is related to individual investment in human capital, 
the former approximated by both government consumption and social expenditures and the 
latter by international student test scores. Most of the existing empirical analyses on economic 
growth  include  as  proxy  of  human  capital  some  measure  of  quantity of  education in the 
population. This is obviously a crude measure, and we follow Wössmann (2003a) who argues 
that the number of quality-education-years  varies across  countries stronger than  the  mere 
duration  of  education,  with  which  it  might  even  be  uncorrelated.  Indeed,  Hanushek  and 
Kimko (2000) find that average student achievement in compulsory schooling is a much more 
sizable determinant of economic growth than years of education in the population. The strong 
effect of student achievement is confirmed by Hanushek and Wössmann (2007) and Jamison, 
Jamison and Hanushek (2007).   2 
 
 
In this analysis we employ data from several comparative international tests that have been 
conducted over the last three decades. We focus on tests in mathematics and science for the 
age group 13-15 years and include eight tests in the period 1980-2003 for a maximum of 79 
countries, giving rise to an unbalanced panel of 246 observations that allows the application 
of panel data estimation methods. Existing studies utilizing cross-country variation in student 
achievement  are  either  almost  exclusively  based  on  a  cross-section  of  individual  test 
performances  in  the  same  test  of  a  single  year,  see  for  example  Wössmann  (2003b)  and 
Frölich, Bourdon, and Michaelowa, (2007), or the average in performance across many years 
as in Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Hanushek  and Wössmann (2007), and Jamison  et  al. 
(2007). We follow the latter methodological approach but exploit the panel structure in the 
data  and  estimate  country  fixed  effects  models  that  account  for  unobserved  national 
heterogeneity.  Our  empirical  findings  indicate  that  a  more  generous  welfare  state  is 
detrimental to student performance.  
 
Our empirical analysis is preceded by a simple economic model that relates the size and the 
scope of the welfare state to education investment in terms of student effort. The insurance 
aspect of the welfare state manifests in a system that both reduces the risk of future income 
and that redistributes from high income individuals to low income individuals. In traditional 
human capital models (Becker, 1964) where educational outcomes are determined by rational 
decision-making  of  individuals  weighting  costs  and  benefits,  increased  redistribution  of 
income  is  predicted  to  weaken  the  incentive  to  invest  in  education  (for  an  exemplary 
theoretical model, see Poutvaara, 2007). The prediction of the effect of reduced idiosyncratic 
risk in future income is more complicated and ambiguous. In a traditional investment model 
analogous to models in financial economics, Charles and  Luoh (2003) show that reduced 
uncertainty in education returns increases the investment in education. On the other hand, 
investments in education have several similarities with real options. Hogan and Walker (2007) 
and  Jacobs  (2007)  show  in  a  framework  where  risky  investments  in  human  capital  are 
irreversible  that  reduced  variability  in  the  return  to  education  investments  lowers  the 
investment since the upside payoff is reduced by more than the downside.  
 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  The  next  section  presents  the  theoretical  considerations. 
Section 3 describes the international student tests data and our measure of average student 
attainment,  section  4  presents  the  empirical  model,  and  section  5  discusses  the  empirical 
results. Section 6 offers some concluding comments. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                          
1 Ehrlich and Kim (2007) report that, not unsurprisingly in a growth context, the estimates are sensitive to   3 
 
2.  Theoretical considerations 
 
We present a simple partial two-period model that illustrates how redistribution of income and 
income uncertainty affects students’ incentives in schools. The model builds on Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1992), but differs by including income redistribution and uncertainty. Consider a 
life-time utility maximizing individual living in two periods. In period one, the individual 
invests  in  her  human capital. The  investment is  modeled as  the  residual  time  devoted  to 
education Z instead of leisure L, where Z + L is normalized to unity. Thus, effort at school has 
an opportunity cost in terms of foregone leisure, but is an investment in future income. In 
period  two,  the  individual  consumes  the  return  on  her  education  investment.  Neglecting 
discounting and assuming separability over time, the life-time utility in expectational terms is 
{ } ( ) { } E V u 1 Z E U(C) = − +     (1) 
where the utility functions u and U are concave. 
 
In this model, the welfare state is an institution that transfers a fraction τ of the income from 
individuals  with  high  income  to  individuals  with  low  income,  and  thus  reduces  the 
consumption inequality in the society in period two. The uncertainty of the representative 
agent’s  future  income  is  captured  by  two  independent  random  components.  One  type  of 
uncertainty is related to the return of education investment (ε1) and the other is independent of 
the return (ε2), such as macroeconomic shocks, where E(εi) = 0 and  ( )
2
i i Var ε = σ , i = 1, 2. We 
write the consumption in period two as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 2 C 1 y Z 1 y = −τ +ε +ε +τ     (2) 
where the right hand side is the representative individual’s income after redistribution. The 
deterministic part of the income is the productivity that depends on effort in school, y(Z), with 
diminishing returns ( ( ) ( ) y Z 0, y Z 0 ′ ′′ > < ). Because of income redistribution only a fraction 
1–τ of the consumption is related to own productivity while the fraction τ is related to the 
average productivity in society,  y. This formulation implies that individuals with productivity 
below (above) the mean will have an increasing (decreasing) consumption in transfer income 
τ(y – (y(Z)(1+ ε1) + ε2)). Thus, τ is an indicator of the generosity of the welfare state. For 
simplicity, the implicit taxation and transfer rules are not written down in the model.  
 
The individual maximizes equation (1) with respect to effort Z subject to constraint (2). The 
first order condition is 
                                                                                                                                                          
whether the models condition on initial GDP or not.    4 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) { } 1 u 1 Z 1 y Z E U C 1 ′ ′ ′ − = −τ +ε .    (3) 
In optimum, the marginal cost of effort is equal to the expected marginal return to effort. To 
keep  the  analysis  simple,  we  continue  with  the  quadratic  utility  function 
( )
2
2 U C C C 2 = α −β . Then the first order condition (3) can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 u 1 Z 1 y Z 1 1 y Z y   ′ ′ − = −τ α−β −τ +σ +τ
    (4) 
 
Calculation  of  the  partial  derivates  of  (4)  is  straightforward.  Regarding  the  redistribution 
parameter τ, its partial effect on effort Z is given by  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1
u 1 Z dZ 1
1 y Z y 1 y Z
d D 1
′ −  
′ = − +β −τ − +σ   τ −τ  
  (5) 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
1 D 1 1 y Z u 1 Z y Z u 1 Z y Z 0 ′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′ =β −τ +σ − − − − > . The first term in 
the bracket reflects that the incentive to invest in education is reduced when the return to 
education declines. The sign of the second term in the bracket depends on the relative income 
position. For individuals with income below the mean  y, increased redistribution increases 
income and decreases the marginal utility of consumption, which partially lowers investment 
in education. For rich people, however, income decreases and thus the marginal utility of 
consumption increases, partially working in the direction of higher investment. In principle, 
this indirect effect of income redistribution may be so strong that its total effect on education 
investment is positive. For a representative individual with income close to mean income,
2 the 
effect of redistribution is negative.
  
 
Regarding uncertainty, it follows from (4) that 








= − < =
σ σ   (6) 
Increased uncertainty in the return to education σ1
2 decreases investment in education. The 
individuals prefer less risky investments, all else equal. On the other hand, changes in the 
general uncertainty of income 
2
2 σ  have no effect on the education investment.  
 
The result that volatility in the return to education reduces education investment is, however, 
not universally true. While our model considers the investment in effort at school as an asset, 
                                                 
2 Since mean income seems to be higher than median income in all income distributions, it is more reasonable to 
assume that the representative individual has income below the mean than above the mean.   5 
 
education investment may also have similarities with real options. In a model where education 
investment is the time devoted to non-compulsory education, and once the individual has left 
education for the labor market she cannot return to education, Hogan and Walker (2007) show 
that the investment is positively related to the uncertainty in the labor market. If a bad state of 
the labor market occurs, the individual can continue at school, but if a good state occurs, she 
can always switch to the labor market. Increased variability of the state of the labor market 
increases the upside payoff more than the downside payoff and, thus, increases the expected 
return to education investment. Jacobs (2007) reaches the same conclusion in a somewhat 
different model. He assumes that one can always leave the labor market for education. Then 
increased  variability  of  the  return  to  education  increases  the  probability  that  education 
investment is profitable at one point in time.   
 
In this paper, however, we analyze determinants of education outcome at the compulsory 
level. At the compulsory level, termination of education is not regarded as a choice for most 
individuals and time devoted to education measured by months or years is not a decision 
variable. Thus, the mechanisms described by Hogan and Walker (2007) and Jacobs (2007) are 
not  directly  applicable.  However,  the  probability  to  enroll  at  higher,  non-compulsory 
education and the range of higher education institutions an individual student can choose 
among is typically related to past performance at the compulsory level. Thus, low effort in 
compulsory  schooling  reduces  the  probability  to  attain  the  real  option  inherent  in  higher 
education. 
 
The implicit function of education investment that follows from (4) is 
( ) ( )
2
1 Z f , ,y Z g,y = τ σ =
    (7) 
where  ( )
2
1 g g , = τ σ   captures  the  common  effects  of  the  welfare  state.  The  investment  Z 
decreases in  y because the utility function is concave, while the effect of the welfare state g is 
in general ambiguous. However, redistribution of income τ is the dominating aspect of the 
welfare state and has a negative effect on Z. Our testable hypothesis is that a more generous 
welfare state affects individuals’ educational investments negatively.  
 
 
   6 
 
3.  International measures of student achievement 
 
We rely on comparative international tests of student achievement conducted by different 
international organizations. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement (IEA) has been responsible for the largest number of such tests, but also the 
OECD has developed a Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). 
 
We  construct  a  synthetic panel  data set of  the  national averages  of international tests on 
student performance covering a period of almost 25 years (1980 – 2003). As these tests cover 
the core subjects Reading, Mathematics and Natural Science separately, an important question 
is which of them should be included in a time-series cross-section of test scores. We restrict 
our attention to student assessments in Mathematics and Science for two reasons. First, these 
two subjects have more similarities with each other than with Reading and are thus more 
suitable  for  constructing  a  synthetic  panel,  besides  that  Reading  is  tested  less  regularly 
internationally. Second and more important, it is performance in Mathematics and Natural 
Science that are more likely to determine a country’s innovativeness in an economic growth 
context,  as  empirically  tested  in  Hanushek  and  Wössmann  (2007).  Comparability  of  test 
results is also given in the age dimension, as all tests included are conducted on middle-aged 
students  (13-15  years).  Choosing  this  age  group  has  also  the  advantage  that  compulsory 








Even though all tests are in the fields ‘Mathematics’ and ‘Science’, they do not necessarily 
test  the  same  cognitive  skill:  The  IEA  tests  are  related  to  common  elements  of  school 
curricula across countries while IAEP is geared towards the curriculum in USA building on 
the national testing procedures developed by the National Assessment of Education Progress 
NAEP. The OECD PISA test has a more real-world approach and claims to assess the skills 
that are considered to be essential for full participation in the society. These differences do 
not, however, seem to be very important with respect to measured student performance. For 
example, the correlation coefficient between the test results for the 18 countries participating 
both in TIMSS 2003 and PISA 2003 is 0.94.
3 
                                                 
3 The correlation coefficient between the average Science and Mathematics score in TIMSS-repeat 1999 and 
PISA 2000 is 0.87 and for IAEP 1991 and TIMSS 1995 the correlation coefficient is 0.80. The correlation   7 
 
 
Recently, it has become common to report national averages based on Items Response Theory 
weighting the different questions by their difficulty (“Warm estimates”, Warm, 1989), and 
standardizing the scores such that the average across all students across countries participating 
is 500 with standard deviation of 100. With this approach, the average score of a particular 
country will depend on the achievement of the students in the other participating countries. 
Thus, the official test score for a particular country is not necessarily comparable over time, 
particularly when the composition of the country sample changes. More importantly, for the 
tests prior to 1991, “Warm estimates” were not calculated, so that we have to rely on the share 
of correct answers for these tests.
4  
 
To make the scores on the different international tests comparable on a common metric, we 
have re-scaled the average scores for each international test by the following procedure. First 
we calculate the average of the Mathematics and Science tests when both subjects are tested. 
Second,  we  standardize  the  average  score  for  each  test  to  have  mean  zero  and  standard 
deviation equal to unity for a “core” group of 15 countries. The “core” is defined as the 
countries that have participated in at least six out of the eight international tests reported in 
Table  1,  namely  Australia,  Canada,  Hong  Kong,  Hungary,  Israel,  Italy,  Japan,  Korea, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, UK, and USA.
5 Third, we re-scale the 
scores for each of the other countries using the same parameters as for the “core” countries. 
Finally, since there are two tests for many countries in 2003 (TIMSS and PISA), we calculate 
the average of those tests in 2003. 
 
Making the results from different tests comparable has been a challenge also for previous 
empirical studies. For example, Hanushek and Kimko (2000) calculate a measure of labor-
force quality based on the percent of correct answers in international student achievement 
tests  for  the  period  1965-1991.  They  adjust  the  mean  for  each  test,  but  not  the  variance 
(except the linear scaling that follows from the adjustment of the mean). Adjusting the means 
is crucial in their analysis because they subsequently calculate an aggregated quality measure 
for each country. More recently, Hanushek and Wössmann (2007) utilize tests from TIMSS, 
PISA  and  the  IEA  up  to  2003  and,  in  addition  to  adjusting  the  means,  they  correct  the 
                                                                                                                                                          
coefficients are calculated using the adjusted test score described below. Interestingly, as can be seen from 
Figure 2 below, USA has its poorest performance in the IAEP test that was based on the US curriculum. 
4 We have compared the Warm estimates and percent correct answers for the IEA tests in 1994-95 and 1998-99 
for  which  both  measures  are  available.  The  correlation  coefficients  for  Mathematics  are  0.997  and  0.982, 
respectively, and for Science 0.994 and 0.977, respectively. Thus, the differences across countries do not seem to 
be influenced in any important way by the choice of scale. 
5 More precisely, we standardize the score for those of the “core” countries that participated in the particular test. 
Out of the 15 “core” countries used to standardize the test scores, the data sources reports results for 11 countries 
in 1980-81, 12 in 1983-84, 8 in 1990-91, 15 in 1994-1995, 14 in 1998-99, 15 in OECD 2000, 13 in TIMSS 2003 
and 13 in OECD 2003. Only USA has test scores for all tests.   8 
 
dispersion of each single test in a similar way as ours, but their “core” countries include 13 
OECD countries with “stable education systems”. 
 
Figure 1a shows that the density of our measure of student achievement across the 15 “core” 
countries observations is close to the normal distribution. The density for all observations 
presented in Figure 1b has a long left tail, illustrating that some countries, mostly developing 








In fixed effects models, identification is only based on within-country variation. Figure 2 
shows the development over time for the “core” countries. The figure indicates that there are 
some  systematic  changes.  For  example,  the  relative  achievement  in  the  more  neo-liberal 
Western economies USA, Canada and UK increased during the 1990s, while the achievement 
declined in Israel and in the transition countries Russia and Hungary. Some countries perform 
consistently better than others. For example, Italy performs below average and Netherlands 
performs  above  average  in  each  test.  However,  Figure  3  shows  that  there  is  quite  some 
variation in the change in student achievement, although the variation is lower than that for 





Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
   
 
 
4.  Model specification 
 
We estimate the following model 
1 2 3 4 5 log( / ) log( ) it it it it it it i it Z g GDP POP POP PISA IEA =β +β +β +β +β +φ +ε   (8) 
                                                 
6 In Figure 3, only observations with at most eight years interval are utilized.   9 
 
git is a measure of the welfare state of country i in year t (discussed in detail below), while 
GDP per capita (GDP/POP) is the proxy for  y in (7). In addition we include population size 
(POP) and country specific effects  i φ . We also include indicators for testing organization, 
(PISA) and (IEA), to control for systematic differences in test design. By employing country 
fixed effects we take account of unobservable time-invariant country characteristics. Among 
them, given the period of our analysis and the countries included, are factors such as societal 
income  inequality,  return  to  education,  and  population  characteristics  like  average  risk 
aversion and educational level.
7  
 
It is a question how to specify the time structure of the model. In our theoretical model, it is 
assumed that it is the welfare state arrangements in the future that affect students’ investment 
decisions made today. We argue that the current societal situation may be the best proxy of 
students’ expectations on her net income. On the other hand, it may equally be argued that the 
production of educational achievement is cumulative. For this reason, expectations of students 
and parents at earlier grades in the past may be important for observed achievement today, at 
the age of 13-15 years. To some extent this is taken into account by the fixed effects approach 
because the identification is based on within-country changes, but we will also investigate this 
issue  by  using  five-years  moving  averages  in  the  independent  variables  in  some  model 
specifications. 
 
Our focal determinant in this analysis, the welfare state git, is made operational in two ways: 
Firstly,  we  employ  general  government  consumption  spending  (in  percentage  of  GDP), 
obtained  from  the  WDI  2007  database  of  the  World  Bank,  a  widely  used  measure  of 
government involvement in the economy and has been employed in various cross-country 
growth  studies  (Fölster  and  Henrekson,  2001,  Agell  et  al.,  2006)  and  happiness  studies 
(Bjørnskov,  Dreher  and  Fischer,  2007  and  2008).  Government  consumption  excludes 
financial transfer arrangements of the welfare state, but includes the production of services 
and public goods that is the responsibility of the government and mostly financed by taxes. 
Given that most public goods are financed through progressive tax systems, they entail a 
strong consumption redistribution aspect. Secondly, we use public sector social expenditures 
                                                 
7 Notice that the model does not include time specific effects. One purpose of the scaling of the test scores 
described above is to make the scores comparable over time. By including time specific effects, the model would 
in essence draw inference on which other countries that participated on the different tests, but not on the within 
country changes compared to a “core” set of countries. We have also estimated models with time specific effects, 
but they where not jointly significant.   10 
 
(in percentage of GDP) that are obtained from OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX) 
and includes aggregated public expenditures of all government tiers.
8 This measure captures 
transfers  from  government  institutions,  namely  “benefits  to,  and  financial  contributions 
targeted  at,  households  and  individuals  in  order  to  provide  support  during  circumstances 
which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and financial 
contributions  constitutes  neither  a  direct  payment  for  a  particular  good  or  service  nor  an 
individual contract  or transfer.”  (OECD, 2007,  p. 7). Broadly  spoken, the OECD defines 
expenditures as ‘social’ if they satisfy two criteria: first, they have to intend a social purpose, 
and,  second,  these  programs  must  be  based  on  either  inter-personal  redistribution  or 
compulsory  participation  (OECD,  2007,  p.  8).  As  policy  objectives  vary  slightly  across 
OECD  member  states,  so  do  the  classifications  of  government  expenditures  as  ‘social’. 
Components of social spending as defined by the OECD include “cash benefits (e.g. pensions, 
income support during maternity leave, and social assistance payments), social services (e.g. 
childcare, care for the elderly and disabled) and tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax 
expenditures towards families with children, or favorable tax treatment of contributions to 
private health plans)” (ibidem, p.7) (see Table 2). As this measure excludes administrative 








Figure 4 presents within country variation in social expenditures as a share of GDP for the 
“core” countries with data available. There is a tendency of increased social expenditures 
during the empirical period. The average share of social expenditures for the countries in the 
figure increased from 0.17 in 1980 to 0.19 in 2003.
9 Netherlands is the only country with 
reduced  social  expenditures,  while  Japan  has  the  largest  growth.  Notice  that  social 
expenditures as a share of GDP serve as automatic stabilizers and, thus, typically decrease in a 
                                                 
8 The OECD defines expenditures as ‘public’ (as opposed to being ’private’) when institutions of the General 
Government control the relevant financial flows. The ‘General Government’ in this context includes different 
levels of government and social security funds. This definition of ‘public’ includes, often by tradition, transfers 
by compulsory social insurances and social assistance schemes (see also OECD 2007, p.8-10). 
9 For all 29 OECD countries included in the empirical analyses, social expenditures increase from 17 percent of 
GDP in 1980 to 21 percent in 2003.   11 
 
boom and increase in a recession. Thus, it is important to include GDP in the empirical model 








We  also  employ  components  of  public  social  expenditure  separately  that  differentiate 
government  transfers  by  different  social  policy  areas  such  as  on,  e.g.,  health,  old-age, 
unemployment,  active  labor  market  policies,  housing,  and  family.  Table  2  provides  an 
overview of spending programs that are attributed to each policy area. For our analysis, we 
employ those spending categories to which the major population is, in principle, entitled to 
(that  excludes  ‘survivor’  or  ‘incapacity’  benefits  as  well  as  ‘other  social  expenses’).  The 
correlation coefficient between government consumption spending (from the WDI) and total 
social spending (from the OECD) is equal to 0.67 in our sample. 
 
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics on government consumption, social expenditures, 
and  the  single  components  of  social  expenditures.  The  variance  in  social  expenditures  is 
slightly  higher  than  for  government  consumption,  both  overall  and  within  countries.  The 
within country variation, for which we identify the effects on student achievement, constitutes 
7-8  percent  of  the  overall  variance.  Pension  spending  is  the  largest  component  of  social 
expenditures, followed by public health spending.  Whether we will find significant effects or 
not may depend on the amount of within-country variation for the specific component of 
interest. In particular housing subsidies and active labor market policy exert little within-
country variation. On the other hand, there have been some reforms in the social security 
systems over the last 20 years.  
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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5.  Empirical Results 
 
 
5.1. Government consumption 
Table 4 presents results for government consumption spending including up to 72 countries 
and  232  observations.  The  first  column  simply  presents  the  correlation  between  student 
achievement and government size, measured by government consumption spending as share 
of GDP. There is no unconditional relationship. Column (2) adds some control variables, 
namely national income, dummies for the testing organizations and population size.
10 The 
effects of population size and organization are insignificant, but there is a strong positive 
effect of GDP per capita. The positive income effect mirrors Hanushek and Kimko (2000) 
who  find  a  positive  effect  of student  achievement  on economic growth,  but contrasts the 
prediction  of  our  theoretical  model.  The  conditional  effect  of  government  consumption 
appears  large  and  highly  significant.  Conditional  on  income,  a  small  public  sector  is 









The last part of Table 4 presents models with country fixed effects that mitigate the potential 
omitted variable problem. In particular, the fixed effects capture that student achievement is 
highest  in  developed  countries.  Indeed,  including  fixed  effects  makes  the  effect  of  GDP 
smaller  in  magnitude and insignificant  at  the  5 percent  level  (column (3)).  However, the 
performance lowering effect of government consumption remains unchanged. Furthermore, 
columns (4) and (5) show that the effect seems to be of similar size for OECD-countries and 
non-OECD countries, albeit insignificant when we split the sample.
11 Overall, the evidence is 
in  accordance  with  our  hypothesis  that  a  more  generous  welfare  system  generates 
disincentives  for  educational  investment.  The  result  indicates  that  when  government 
                                                 
10 Following the traditional public finance literature, we will refer to this measure of welfare state as government 
size. Please note that, in principle, inclusion of population size allows to interpret government spending also as 
generosity towards the general population that is entitled to consume these public goods. 
11 The sample is split according to OECD membership in the year 2000.   13 
 
consumption spending as a share of GDP increases by one log-point, student achievement is 
reduced by almost one “core country” standard deviation. 
 
5.2. Social expenditures 
Table  5  presents  results  for  government  social  expenditures  using  29  OECD  countries, 
resulting  in  a  sample  of  124  observations.  Column  (1)  shows  that  the  unconditional 
correlation between social expenditures and student achievement is negative and significant at 
5 percent level. The difference of the unconditional effect compared to Table 4 is likely due to 
the  fact  that  only  rich  (OECD)  countries  form  the  sample  for  the  analysis  of  social 
expenditures.  Inclusion  of  co-variates  (column  2)  even  increases  the  effect  of  social 
expenditures  both  in  terms  of  magnitude  and  statistical  significance.  Also  within  OECD 
countries, there is an important impact of GDP. Column (3) in Table 5 adds country fixed 
effects.  The  effect  of  social  expenditures  is  still  significant  at  5  percent  level  and  of 








In the last part of Table 5 we analyze student performance regarding the different components 
of social expenditures relating to specific social policy areas. In column (4) we replace total 
social expenditures with all its various components. All components have a negative sign as 
expected,  except  health  care  spending  (zero  effect)  and  family  allowances:  The  effect  of 
expenditures  for  family  allowances  is  positive  and  significant.  Relaxing  parents’  budget 
constraints  in  the  poorest  families  appears  to  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  average 
achievement level of students. 
 
The different expenditure components are positively correlated, which may contribute to the 
heterogeneous and mainly insignificant effects in column (4). Thus, we have run regressions 
including each of the components separately. In all cases, the effects are negative, except for 
family allowances. Columns (5)-(7) in Table 5 report the three cases where the effects are 
significant at least at the 10 percent level. The effects of spending on active labor market   14 
 
policies  and  pension  payments  are  both  performance  lowering,  and  since  the  former 
constitutes only a small part of social expenditures, the negative effect of social expenditures 
seem to a large part be driven by pension spending.
12 In contrast, family allowances have a 
positive and significant effect also when included as the only expenditure component in the 
model. In contrast, unemployment spending and health spending never appear as decisive 
determinants of student performance.  
 
 
5.3 Generosity of the welfare system 
The size of the government sector expressed in percentage of GDP is commonly viewed as a 
proxy for the generosity of the government in terms of public goods creation and financial 
transfers to households. However, in principle, generosity of social transfers can be directly 
assessed  only  if  values  per  recipient  in  place  of  per  capita  numbers  are  employed.  As 
information  on  number  of  recipients  is  not  easily  available,  we  analyze  the  effects  of 
generosity by estimating models with some components of social expenditures together with a 
measure of number of recipients, by using either the share of elderly in the population or the 
share of unemployed in the active population. Indeed, omission of beneficiary measures might 
bias  our  results  as  the  spending  estimates  might  capture  population  composition  effects. 
Simple correlations of the spending measures with the number of its beneficiaries are large.
13 
For this reason, we also conduct F-tests of joint significance as the high correlation might 
inflate the standard errors of the corresponding estimated coefficients.  
 
In Table 6, we present results for models with measures of the number of recipients included. 
Taken  all  together,  since  the  baseline  model  findings  prevail,  the  results  indicate  that 
government size is a good proxy for the generosity of the welfare state, which appears to 
lower student performance. Pension spending and active labor market policy spending still 
exert a performance lowering impact when the share of elderly and the unemployment rate, 
respectively, are included in the model (columns 1 and 2), while the effects of unemployment 
and  health  care  spending  remain  insignificant  (columns  3  and  4).  The  similarity  of  the 
coefficients on the spending variables with the original models reported in Table 5 suggests 
                                                 
12 We are unable to exclude the possibility that more public expenditures on pension may equally proxy for a 
large body of civil servants. In this case, the prospects of becoming a civil servant with high job security and 
generous retirement options may equally lower effort in mandatory schooling.    15 
 
that the bias from using per GDP measures in place of per recipient values is rather small. 
Regarding pension spending in column (1), the significance level is reduced to 10 percent 
when the share of elderly is included. However, the share of the population above 60 years of 
age is insignificant at 10 percent level, and the test of joint significance clearly suggests that at 
least one of the variables is related to student achievement. The effect of active labor market 
policies spending is significant at 5 percent level when the unemployment rate is included 
(column 2).   
 
-------------------------------------------- 




5.4. Robustness analyses 
The student achievement tests we include from the 1980s are not average results for jointly 
counted math and science tests as are those tests employed in the ‘post-communist period’, 
(1990s and beyond), but separate tests on the two subjects. It is also usual to argue that the 
test  design  and  test  procedures  have  improved  over  time.  The  dependent  variable  may 
therefore include more measurement error in the 1980s than later on. Table 7 presents results 
for regressions on the subsample 1990-2003. Columns (1) and (2) in the table show that both 
the effect of government consumption and that of social expenditures are in fact larger in this 








It might also be argued that government consumption spending and the generosity of the 
welfare state are proxies for educational expenditures. Existing evidence either from analyses 
both within and between countries, indicates that educational expenditures have at most a 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 The correlation coefficients between unemployment spending and unemployment rate is 0.51 and between 
pension spending and the share of the population above the age of 60 is 0.86. The correlation between active 
labor market policy and the unemployment rate is only 0.17.   16 
 
minor  effect  on  student  performance,  see  for  example  Hanushek  and  Luque  (2003).
14  If, 
however, despite this evidence, educational expenditures have a positive effect on student 
achievement,  there  will  be  a  positive  bias  on  the  effect  of  government  size  in  models 
excluding educational expenditures since the variables are likely to be positively correlated. In 
columns (3) - (4) in Table 7 we employ school spending data from the WDI 2007 database, 
which is available for 1991 and, on an annual basis, from 2000 on. We linearly intrapolate the 
gaps. In columns 5 and 6 we add lagged annual public spending on primary school education 
to the baseline model, obtained from the OECD and available from 1986 to 2002. We allow 
for a separate effect of the respective student body size.
15 In general, the effect of educational 
expenditures  is  clearly  insignificant,  and  close  to  zero  on  the  OECD  sample.  Taken  all 
together, the effects of government consumption or welfare spending hardly change when 
school spending is accounted for.  
 
Lastly, we investigate whether the choice of functional form of the model is important. One 
may argue that it is not short-term fluctuations in the independent variables that are important, 
but the development in the medium or long term. We have carried out identical regressions as 
reported in Tables 5 and 6 using 5-year moving averages of the independent variable instead 
of current values. The findings for government consumption spending appear to be sensitive 
to the choice of time window. The effect of the 5-year moving average is clearly insignificant. 
The effect of social expenditures analyzed for the OECD countries, however, is similar to the 
model using current values.
16 We have also investigated whether the results are sensitive to 
using the log of the spending shares, but that does not seem to be the case.
17 
 
                                                 
14 For contrasting evidence exploiting variation across Swiss states, see Fischer (2008). She finds that 
educational spending exerts a decisive impact through teachers’ wages. 
15 A measure of student body for the full sample is not available. 
16 The point estimate of the 5-year moving average of social expenditures is exactly equal to the effect of the 
current value, but only significant at 10 percent level. The effects of 5-year moving averages of active labor 
market policy and pension spending are also qualitatively similar to that of the models in Table 5. In contrast, 
family  allowances  appear  not  to  affect  student  performance  in  the  medium-run,  while  support  of  needy 
families in the form of housing subsidies exerts a beneficial effect. The results are available on request.  
17 Including the share of government consumption at level and squared form in the model, both variables have a 
significant effect at ten percent level. Student achievement is lowest for government consumption of about 30 
percent of GDP. This is clearly at the upper part of the distribution of government consumption, indicating 
that the log-form chosen in the baseline model is a reasonably approximating. For social expenditures, not 
assuming the log-form yields identical results for pension spending, active labor market spending and family 
allowances, but not for total social spending. The results are available on request.   17 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The recent publications of international comparative student achievement tests such as PISA 
and TIMSS have spurred the debate on school quality in many countries. Indeed, empirical 
analyses  suggest  that  it  is  educational  quality  rather  than  quantity  in  terms  of  years  of 
education that matters to economic growth. While most of the discussion has been centered 
around  educational resource use  and  institutions,  analyses of  macro  incentives implicit in 
economic policy is limited. At the same time, there is an ongoing debate whether the welfare 
state has excessively grown over the last decennials leading to hampered macro-economic 
growth  through  bureaucratic  waste  and  high  income  taxation.  Indeed,  recent  happiness 
research suggests that government consumption spending reduces welfare in society, both at 
the individual as well as at the aggregate level (Bjørnskov et al., 2007 and 2008).  
 
This paper provides a link between these two strands of literature, providing a theoretical and 
empirical investigation into the effects of the size of the welfare state on investment in human 
capital during mandatory education. A simple economic model demonstrates that individuals’ 
optimal  investment  in  human  capital  declines  in  the  generosity  of  the  welfare  system. 
Empirically we test the impact of  government social spending on student achievement in 
mathematics and science at the lower secondary education level using a panel of up to 72 
countries during the period 1980-2003. In fixed effects models that account for unobserved 
country  heterogeneity,  we  identify  a  student  performance  deteriorating  impact  of  a  more 
generous welfare state, measured by either general government consumption spending or, for 
OECD countries, more narrowly by social welfare spending. The generosity of the social 
security system seems to be of particular importance. 
 
Overall, this paper contributes to the branch of empirical (and theoretical) literature which 
suggests that cuts in the welfare state and government consumption spending might have 
beneficial effects to society – in both OECD and non-OECD countries. However, reality often 
is more complex and a differentiated view is advisable. The policy implications from our 
results are limited by the fact that empirical findings in form of ‘point estimates’ always must 
be interpreted as ‘local’ changes. Thus, our results cannot be interpreted as if it were optimal 
in terms of student performance to cut government spending down to zero. Indeed, in the 
OECD country sample, we find a positive impact of family allowance payments. This result   18 
 
suggests that different components of social welfare might exert educational investment in 
different ways, potentially rather calling for a re-targeting of the means rather than simply 
cutting  them in order to promote growth via human  capital  investment. We also have  to 
acknowledge that our findings are for high- and middle-high income countries only - leaving 
the  question  unanswered  to  what  extent  least  developed  countries  are  affected  by  such 
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18 Indeed, also Bjørnskov et al. (2007) argue that their well-being lowering influence of the size of government 
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Table 1. Data sources description 
Year  Test 
organization Acronym  Test subjects   Test age 
or grade  Countries  Data source 
1980-81  IEA  SIMS  Mathematics  13 years  3 in 1980 
14 in 1981 
Lee and Barro (1997) 
Travers and Westbury (1989) 
1983-85  IEA  SISS  Science  14 years 
11 in 1983 
11 in 1984 
1 in 1985 
Postlethwaite and Wiley (1992) 
1990-91  IAEP  IAEP  Mathematics 
and science  13 years  2 in 1990 
17 in 1991  Lee and Barro (1997) 
1994-95  IEA  TIMSS  Mathematics 
and science  Grade 8  4 in 1994 
36 in 1995  timss.bc.edu/ 
1998-99  IEA  TIMSS-repeat  Mathematics  
and science  Grade 8  6 in 1998 
31 in 1999  timss.bc.edu/ 
2000-02  OECD  PISA 2000  Mathematics 
and science  15 years  32 in 2000 
9 in 2002  www.pisa.oecd.org 
2002-03  IEA  TIMSS 2003  Mathematics 
and science  Grade 8  7 in 2002 
38 in 2003  timss.bc.edu/ 
2003  OECD  PISA 2003  Mathematics 
and science  15 years  40 in 2003  www.pisa.oecd.org 
Note. For some countries separate scores are reported for different parts of the country. We have calculated mean 
country averages by using population as weight. IEA (except the 1983/84 test) and IAEP tests are conducted in 
the fall in the southern hemisphere and in the spring in the northern hemisphere. PISA 2000 originally only 
included five non-OECD countries, but nine additionally non-OECD countries conducted the same test in 2002. 
 
 
Table 2. Types of social expenditures in OECD countries 
Policy area  Programs 
Old-age  Pensions, early retirement pensions, home-help, residential services for the 
elderly.  
Survivors  Pensions and funeral payments.  
Incapacity-related  Care services, disability benefits, benefits accruing from occupational injury 
and accident legislation, employee sickness payments.  
Health  Spending on in- and out-patient care, medical goods, prevention.  
Family  Child allowances and credits, childcare support, income support during 
leave, sole parent payments.  
Active labour market policies  Employment services, training youth measures subsidised employment, 
employment measures for the disabled.  
Unemployment  Unemployment compensation, severance pay, early retirement for labour 
market reasons. 
Housing  Housing allowances and rent subsidies. 
Other social policy areas  Non-categorical cash benefits to low-income households, other social 
services; i.e. support programmes such as, food subsidies, which are 
prevalent in some non-OECD countries.  
Note. Source is Social Expenditure 1980-2003, OECD 2007, p.8.   23 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of government consumption and social expenditures 
  Obser-












General government consumption 
spending, percent of GDP  232  17.65  5.39  1.46  5.69   41.47 
General government consumption 
spending, percent of GDP 
122 
(OECD)  18.70  4.22  1.05  10.08  29.62 
Public sector social expenditures, 
percent of GDP 
118 
(OECD)  19.77  5.61  1.57  2.80  32.50 
Active labor market policy 
spending, share of GDP 
117 
(OECD)  0.62  0.44  0.19  0.00  2.20 
Public health spending, share of 
GDP 
121 
(OECD)  5.54  1.28  0.67  0.00  8.30 
Family allowance spending, share 
of GDP  
118 
(OECD)  1.92  1.08  0.28  0.00  4.10 
Unemployment benefit spending, 
share of GDP 
115 
(OECD)  1.18  0.90  0.44  0.00  4.40 
Pension spending,  
share of GDP 
118 
(OECD)  6.42  2.76  0.73  0.60  12.80 
Housing spending,  
share of GDP  
98 
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Table 4. The effect of government consumption on student achievement 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Population size (log)  -  0.058  0.191  0.558  -0.017 
    (0.78)  (0.22)  (0.36)  (0.01) 
GDP per capita (log)  -  1.646**  0.707+  0.252  1.043+ 
    (10.2)  (1.91)  (0.51)  (1.71) 
PISA  -  -0.084  -0.126  0.071  -0.471 
    (0.25)  (0.80)  (0.44)  (1.39) 
IEA  -   0.070  -0.115  -0.187  0.176 
    (0.21)  (0.80)  (1.36)  (0.52) 
-0.107  -1.202**  -0.911*  -0.894  -0.808  Government consumption 
spending, percent of GDP (log)  (0.26)  (3.21)  (2.00)  (1.08)  (1.25) 
           
Sample  All  All  All  OECD  Non-
OECD 
Country fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  232  231  231  131  100 
Countries  72  71  71  29  42 
R
2  0.0003  0.325  0.9348  0.8151  0.9442 
R
2 (within)
  -  -  0.0757  0.1255  0.1338 
Note. Absolute t-values in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5. The effect of social expenditures on student achievement 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
               
Population size (log)  -  0.049  0.699  -1.657  0.622  -0.159  -0.823 
    (0.80)  (0.45)  (0.67)  (0.38)  (0.11)  (0.53) 
GDP per capita (log)  -  0.893**  0.108  0.78  0.207  0.376  0.193 
    (3.02)  (0.20)  (1.00)  (0.34)  (0.69)  (0.35) 
PISA  -  0.226  0.258  0.074  0.198  0.246  0.104 
    (0.92)  (1.63)  (0.35)  (1.30)  (1.60)  (0.64) 
IEA  -  0.326  -0.083  -0.291  -0.13  -0.084  -0.196 
    (1.35)  (0.62)  (1.64)  (1.01)  (0.66)  (1.45) 
-.488*  -0.757**  -0.870*  -  -  -  -  Government social expenditures, 
percent of GDP  (2.18)  (3.12)  (2.01)         
Unemployment spending (log)  -  -  -  -0.008  -  -  - 
        (0.06)       
Family allowances (log)  -  -  -  0.740*  -  -  0.575* 
        (2.41)      (2.25) 
Pension spending (log)  -  -  -  -1.036+  -  -0.821**  - 
        (1.85)    (2.84)   
Active labor market policy   -  -  -  -0.274  -0.408*  -  - 
spending (log)        (1.08)  (2.56)     
Health care spending (log)  -  -  -  0.02  -  -  - 
        (0.03)       
Housing spending (log)  -  -  -  -0.115  -  -  - 
        (0.65)       
               
County fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  124  124  124  82  116  124  123 
Countries  29  29  29  20  29  29  29 
R
2  0.0376  0.1276  0.8457  0.7821  0.8392  0.8521  0.8433 
R
2 (within)
  -  -  0.1740  0.4274  0.2630  0.2079  0.1845 
Note. Absolute t-values in parentheses, +, * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Generosity of the welfare state: OECD countries 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Population size (log)  -0.688  0.401  -0.03  .193 
  (0.45)  (0.21)  (0.02)  (0.12) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.61  0.511  0.172  .380 
  (1.02)  (0.67)  (0.25)  (0.63) 
Pension spending (log)  -0.738+  -  -  - 
  (1.71)       
Active labor market policy   -  -0.443**  -  - 
spending (log)    (2.55)     
Unemployment spending (log)  -  -  0.046  - 
      (0.28)   
Health care spending (log)  -  -  -  0.543 
        (1.06) 
Share of elderly (log)  -1.284  -  -  -2.348** 
  (1.45)      (3.13) 
Unemployment rates  -  -0.01  -0.039  - 
    (0.39)  (1.25)   
         
Dummy variables for testing institution  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  113  113  116  115 
Countries  28  29  28  28 
R2  0.8538  0.8384  0.8210  0.8406 
R
2 (within)  0.2848  0.2621  0.1858  0.2332 
F-test (social spending, recipients)  6.93**  3.60*  1.01  4.91 
(p-value)  0.0017  0.0318  0.3670  0.0097 
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Table 7. Post-communist period 1990-2003; including educational expenditures 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Population size (log)  0.564  3.983  -0.327  1.792  2.553  3.856 
  (0.48)  (1.29)  (0.28)  (0.59)  (0.74)  (1.15) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.590  0.745  0.729  0.884  0.823  -.035 
  (1.22)  (0.85)  (1.57)  (1.05)  (0.85)  (0.04) 
Government consumption   -1.358**  -  -1.660**  -  -  - 
Expenditures, percent of GDP (log)  (2.75)    (3.19)       
Government social expenditures,   -  -1.080*  -  -0.844  -1.049  -2.031* 
percent of GDP (log)    (2.08)    (1.53)  (1.18)  (2.10) 
Education expenditures,   -  -  0.691  -0.13  -  - 
percent of GDP (log)      (1.19)  (0.18)     
Primary education expenditures lagged   -  -  -  -  0.991+  -0.141 
one year, percent of GDP (log)          (1.78)  (0.20) 
Number of pupils in primary education   -  -  -  -  -  0.848+ 
lagged one year (log)            (1.90) 
             
Sample  All  OECD  All  OECD  OECD  OECD 
Dummies for testing institution  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  198  104  192  100  89  83 
Countries  69  29  68  29  27  26 
R2  0.9550  0.8684  0.9568  0.8795  0.8718  0.8715 
R
2 (within)  0.0910  0.2741  0.1082  0.2771  0.3597  0.3628 
F-test (social spending, school spending)      5.12  1.59  2.15  2.20 
(p-value)      0.0074  0.2110  0.1255  0.1211 
Note. Absolute t-values in parentheses, + * and ** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Kernel density of student achievement  
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